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B.V. ENGINEERING V. UNIVERSITY OF





In the Fall of 1988, the United States Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals rendered a decision of great significance to authors, artists
and computer programmers alike. Although only four pages in
length, the decision in B. V Engineering v. University of California,
Los Angeles,1 casts a wide shadow of doubt over the ability of copy-
right owners to enforce their rights of ownership against the states.
The case unified circuit court opinion on the issues raised and at-
tracted significant input from the U.S. Copyright Office and amici
counsel representing interested industry organizations.
II. FACTS
Plaintiff, B.V. Engineering (B.V.), is the author and vendor of a
series of seven programs used by scientists and engineers. In 1986,
Defendant, University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA),
purchased one copy of this program series and the accompanying
user manual. Each program contained a valid copyright notice and
had been previously registered with the Copyright Office. UCLA
made three copies of each program and ten copies of the user manu-
als. Such copying was unauthorized by B.V.
In July, 1986, B.V. sued UCLA for, inter alia, copyright in-
fringement under Section 501 of the Copyright Act of 1976. All
claims other than the copyright infringement action were dismissed
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with prejudice by the district court. Later, on motion for summary
judgment, the district court also denied the copyright infringement
claim based on UCLA's assertion of the eleventh amendment as a
defense.
B.V. appealed the summary judgment decision. This decision
was subsequently affirmed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in
an opinion filed on October 3, 1988.
III. THE DECISION
In B. V Engineering v. University of California, the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals was presented with the question of whether
the eleventh amendment immunized the University of California
from an infringement action under the Copyright Act of 1976. The
eleventh amendment provides: "The Judicial power of the United
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citi-
zens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State."2 Although not expressly set forth within its terms, the elev-
enth amendment has repeatedly been recognized to prohibit an ac-
tion against a state by one of the state's own citizens. 3
In order to defeat the eleventh amendment immunity defense,
the court in B. V Engineering looked for the existence of either of
two circumstances. The first was a showing that the state had
waived its immunity and had consented to suit in federal court. The
second involved a demonstration that Congress had exercised some
legitimate power and chosen to abrogate the immunity.
Addressing the first circumstance, B.V. argued that the exist-
ence of several California statutes demonstrates the intent of the
State of California to subject itself to federal copyright laws. These
statutes involve the recognition and approval of payment of
royalties.4
The court, however, took the position that, pursuant to Collins
v. Alaska,5 any waiver by the state must be: (a) express; (b) pro-
vided by statute; or (c) clearly intended by Congress as a condition
to the state's participation in the activity related to the state's
waiver of immunity.6 In addressing these three prongs, the court
2. U.S. CONST. amend XI.
3. See, eg., Welch v. Tex. Dep't of Highways and Public Transp., 107 S. Ct. 2941,
2945 (1987) (plurality) (citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10, 10 S. Ct. 504, 505 (1890)).
4. See, CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 60289, 60291 (West 1978 & Supp. 1987).
5. Collins v. Alaska, 823 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1987).
6. Id. at 331-32.
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found first that any such waiver was implied and not express. Sec-
ond, the court found that California's statutory provisions did not
meet the requisite specificity to demonstrate "the State's intention
to subject itself to suit in federal court."7 Finally, the court was
unable to find any indication of Congressional intent to condition
the states' participation in the national copyright scheme on a
waiver of immunity.
Having analyzed and disposed of the issue of waiver of immu-
nity by the state, the court turned to a more difficult question: Did
Congress abrogate the eleventh amendment immunity of the states
through enactment of the Copyright Act?
As the court acknowledged in B. V Engineering, it has not yet
been specifically decided whether Congress has the inherent power
pursuant to Article I to abrogate the eleventh amendment immu-
nity.' This power, however, has been recognized when derived
from Section 5 of the fourteenth amendment.' Several courts, while
assuming this to be the case for purposes of rendering a judgment,
have reserved judgment on the issue as to whether Article I can also
be a source of power to abrogate immunity.10 This too, was the
approach chosen by the court in B. V Engineering. I
The next challenge for the court was whether such an abroga-
tion actually existed. For this critical analysis the court relied on a
line of cases including Welch v. Texas Department of Highways and
Public Transportation 12 and Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon,13
which provide a stringent test for discerning Congressional intent.
In part, this test requires a finding that this intent be statutorily
7. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241, 105 S. Ct. 3142, 3146-47
(1985).
8. B. V Engineering, 858 F.2d at 1394, 1396-97.
9. See, e.g., Collins, 823 F.2d at 332.
10. United States v. Union Gas Co., 832 F.2d 1343, 1350-56 (3d Cir. 1987) (Commerce
Clause, U.S. Const. Art.I, § 8, cl. 3), cert, granted, - U.S. -, 108 S. Ct. 1219 (1988).
11. B.V Engineering, 858 F.2d at 1397, "We assume, without deciding, that Congress
may abrogate the states' eleventh amendment immunity when acting under an Article I
power."
12. Welch, 107 S. Ct. 2941 (1987) (holding that a Texas state employee, who was in-
jured while working on a passenger ferry, was prohibited by the eleventh amendment from
suing the state in federal court under the Jones Act). The Jones Act (46 U.S.C. § 688) pro-
vides for jurisdiction in suits arising from injuries suffered by seamen during the course of
their employment.
13. Atascadero, 473 U.S. 234, 105 S. Ct. 3142 (1985) (holding that the eleventh amend-
ment was a complete defense to a suit against the state). In Atascadero, respondent brought
suit against the state of California for violation of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
alleging that he was wrongfully denied employment in a state hospital due to a physical
handicap. Section 504 prohibits discrimination of handicapped persons by recipients of fed-
eral financial assistance.
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expressed in "unmistakably clear" language and be "unequivocally"
stated.14 For purposes of this article, we shall refer to the line of
cases mandating this test as the "strict scrutiny" cases.
Applying this heightened level of scrutiny, the court was un-
able to identify anything in Section 501 of the Copyright Act of
1976 which would demonstrate a clear Congressional intent to ab-
rogate. The court specifically rejected the argument that the statu-
tory use of the term "anyone" encompassed the states in
"unequivocal statutory language."15
In addition, the court also rejected Plaintiff's arguments that
certain specific sections of the Act itself demonstrated a Congres-
sional intent to subject the states to liability for infringement under
the Copyright Act. Sections 601 and 60216 of the Act were specifi-
cally referenced by Plaintiff as examples demonstrative of such in-
tent. Both sections specifically use the term "State" in allowing such
entities exemptions from liability for certain infringing activities.
Although the court found this argument "tenable" it felt con-
strained by "Atascadero's requirement of clear and unmistakable
statutory language."17 Based on similar reasoning, the court also
rejected the contention that other sections of the Act which referred
to the term "governmental bodies" were not sufficient to defeat this
high strict scrutiny standard.
Lastly, the court, with brevity, and also some reluctance, dis-
missed two powerful issues. The first was whether or not the affirm-
ance of the eleventh amendment immunity defeats the right of
exclusivity an author or inventor is granted under the U.S. Consti-
tution, Article I, Section 8, clause 8. The second, was whether or
not the policies underlying the eleventh amendment protection to
the States are defeated by the abrogation of immunity. For example,
there is no fear of a drain on state treasuries because the state is not
required to infringe on copyrights. Despite the merit of these argu-
ments, the court felt constrained by the strict interpretation cases,
such as Atascadero and Welch, and affirmed the lower court deci-
14. B. V Engineering, 858 F.2d at 1397 (citing Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 242); Welch, 107
S. Ct. at 2947.
15. B V Engineering, 858 F.2d at 1398.
16. 17 U.S.C. § 601(b)(3) (1982) ("The provisions of subsection (a) do not apply.. .(3)
where importation is sought under the authority or for the use, other than in schools, of the
Government of the United States or of any State or political subdivision of a State. ..);
§ 602(a)(1) ("This subsection does not apply to.. .(1) importation of copies or phonorecords
under the authority or for the use of the Government of the United States or of any State or
political subdivision of a State, but including copies or phonorecords for use in schools, or
copies of any audiovisual work imported for purposes other than archival use..
17. B. V Engineering, 858 F.2d at 1399.
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sion. In the end, the court suggested that it is for the legislature to
change the adverse consequences of the case.
IV. ANALYSIS
From B.V. Engineering's perspective, several factors distin-
guish the situation posed in B. V Engineering from that presented in
Welch, Atascadero and the other strict scrutiny cases. It was
stressed that there are different policy considerations underlying the
grant of rights under Article I which make clear that the strict con-
struction rule of "unequivocal expression" should be inapplicable in
the present instance.
Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution provides
in part:
The Congress shall have the power.. [to] promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Au-
thors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writ-
ings and Discoveries.
This provision, as ratified by the states, provides Congress with
a specific grant of power for the purpose of regulating copyrights
and patents. By its very nature the provision becomes a limitation
on the power of the states to act in these areas.
This limitation on the power of the States creates the difference
between the present case and the strict scrutiny cases. In those
cases the underlying grant of power was broad and expansive, not
nearly so specific as the Article I empowerment relating to copy-
rights. In broad and expansive instances, the unequivocal expres-
sion rule is necessary to maintain the proper balance between the
state and federal government. Because it is the federal courts which
are determining the extent of the immunity provided to the states
under the eleventh amendment the strict scrutiny requirement also
serves as a further protection against federal expansion.
This reasoning makes sense when applied to the line of strict
scrutiny cases such as Welch, Atascadero, and Pennhurst State
School & Hospital v. Halderman,1 s where the grant of power to the
States was broad. However, in the present situation it has no appli-
cation. Pursuant to 28 USC section 1338(a), Congress has provided
that the federal courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction over copy-
right infringement suits and that equivalent state laws "to any of the
18. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 104 S. Ct. 900 (1984)
(holding that the eleventh amendment prohibited the district court from ordering state offi-
cials to conform their conduct to state law).
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exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright" are pre-
empted.19 Consequently, there is no tension between state and fed-
eral sovereignty. Exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts has
already been conceded pursuant to the limited grant of authority
contained in Article I. Thus, the source of federal power is of itself
a limitation on federal encroachment.
Another supporting rationale which has been raised in the
strict scrutiny cases is the need to protect the states from fiscal bur-
dens imposed by legislation enacted by Congress under expansive
grants of authority.20 Again, however, this rationale does not apply
because the copyright laws were enacted pursuant to a specific grant
of power. Any possible fiscal impact to the states, should their im-
munity be removed, is de minimis. The fiscal impact would only
arise in situations in which the state conducted an infringing activ-
ity; something which they obviously are not required to do.
In other instances, the state may be required to pay amounts
for the proper use of copyrighted material such as fees for licenses
or royalties. However, these payments are expenses for which Cali-
fornia and many other states have already recognized an obligation
to pay.21
Unfortunately, the greatest distinction between the strict scru-
tiny cases and the present case is also the most deleterious. In the
strict scrutiny line of cases the injured party had the opportunity for
redress in an alternative forum. In Atascadero, for example,
although the state was not subject to suit in federal court it was still
subject to an action in state court. 2 Similarly, in Employees, em-
ployees still had relief in state court for FLSA violations. 23 The
court in Welch also acknowledged that although the state was im-
mune from federal suit under the Jones Act, the plaintiff was "not
without a remedy" for she could still file a state worker's compensa-
tion action.24 This alternative forum, however, is not available in
any copyright infringement action because the federal court is the
19. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1982).
20. Employees v. Dep't of Public Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 284-285 93 S. Ct.
1614, 1618 (1973). In Employees, the employees of a Missouri state hospital brought suit
against the State of Missouri for overtime pay under Section 16(b) of the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act (FLSA). This Act provides for suits against employers for recovery of damages,
including minimum wages and overtime compensation. It is based on the power of Congress
to regulate the working conditions of persons engaged in the production of goods for
commerce.
21. See CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 60289, 60291 (West 1978 & Supp. 1987).
22. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 240 n.2, 105 S. Ct. at 3145.
23. Employees, 411 U.S. at 287, 93 S. Ct. at 1616.
24. Welch, 107 S. Ct. at 2953 n.19.
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exclusive forum for such actions. As a consequence, the court in
B. V Engineering, by upholding the eleventh amendment defense
leaves victims of infringement without a remedy. B.V. Engineering,
amici and the U.S. Copyright Office all take the position that it is
inconceivable that Congress could have intended this drastic result.
An analysis of the court's holding in B. V Engineering does
reveal some inconsistencies. For example, the court's conclusion
that there has not been an unequivocal expression of jurisdictional
intent renders useless many provisions of the Copyright Act which
provide immunity to the states under certain circumstances. 17
USC Section 602(a) allows "any State or political subdivision of a
State" to import certain material from outside the United States
with immunity from infringement actions arising out of Section
501. Only the conclusion that Congress intended the states to be
subject to the Act's provisions provides a logical explanation as to
why such exclusionary language was included.
Other sections of the Act provide immunity from otherwise in-
fringing activities of "governmental bodies," a term which includes
the states.25 These activities include: reproduction of certain broad-
cast transmissions;2 6 reproduction of sound recordings;2 7 perform-
ances of copyrighted works in the course of transmissions for the
handicapped;28 performances or displays of nondramatic literary or
musical works;29 performances of certain copyrighted material dur-
ing annual agricultural or horticultural fairs;3 ° and secondary trans-
missions of copyrighted work.3' Clearly these sections, and
especially Section 110, serve no purpose unless Congress intended
to abrogate eleventh Amendment immunity.
In the opinion of the authors, the correct approach in analyz-
ing the application of the eleventh amendment immunity is one
which recognizes the unique limitations presented by Article I.
This is the view which was adopted in Mills Music, Inc. v. State of
Arizona.32 In Mills, the Ninth Circuit reviewed a case factually sim-
ilar to B. V Engineering. The plaintiff in Mills was the composer of
a musical work which was used, without consent, as the theme song
25. See HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, REPORT OF
THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT
LAW, 87TH CONG., 1ST SESS. at 1229 (Comm. Print July 1961).
26. 17 U.S.C. § 118(d)(3) (1982).
27. 17 U.S.C. §§ 112 (b)-(d) (1982).
28. 17 U.S.C. § 111(8) (1982).
29. 17 U.S.C. § 110(2) (1982).
30. 17 U.S.C. § 110(6) (1982).
31. 17 U.S.C. § 111(a)(4) (1982).
32. Mills Music, Inc. v. Arizona, 591 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir. 1979).
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for the Arizona State Fair. Plaintiff brought suit against the state of
Arizona for copyright infringement. The State of Arizona raised
the eleventh amendment as a defense. Despite the similarities, the
conclusion of the Ninth Circuit in this case was the opposite of that
reached in B. V Engineering. As the court stated:
[A] state may not, consistent with the Constitution, infringe the
federally protected Rights of the copyright holder, and thereafter
avoid the federal system of statutory protections. The "exclusive
rights" of an author, guaranteed under the Constitution and
Copyright Act, would surely be illusory were a state permitted to
appropriate with impunity the rights of a lawful copyright
holder.33
Of course, the court in B. V Engineering determined that Mills
was no longer the law in view of Atascadero. However, it seems
incongruous that the state may utilize the Copyright Act as a sword
against infringers, yet raise the eleventh amendment as a Veil of pro-
tection when the state itself conducts the infringing activity. In fact,
it is interesting to note that the California Attorney General's Office
has for many years accepted the opinion that California may be
sued under the Copyright Act.3 4 Other state attorney general of-
fices agree with California's position.
Given the number and size of state agencies, the dangers cre-
ated by the Ninth Circuit's decision in B. V Engineering should be
evident, and of concern not only to computer programmers, but to
all of the computer industry. An accurate estimate of the potential
dollar damage that could result from the decision is beyond the
scope of this article, but a list of some of the goods commonly
purchased by state governments from the private sector provides an
indication of the tremendous implications of the decision. Software,
movies, television programming and other audiovisual materials,
textbooks, novels, magazines and other printed text materials, re-
corded music, and artwork and graphic designs are just some of the
copyrighted works and products purchased in volume by the state
of California and other state governments nationwide.
V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION
The Ninth Circuit's decision in the case confirms a loophole in
federal copyright law that has the potential of causing hundreds of
millions of dollars in damages and lost profits to affected industries.
33. Mills Music, Inc., 591 F.2d at 1286.
34. See 64 Ops. Cal. Att'y. Gen. 186 (1981); 65 Ops. Cal. Att'y. Gen. 106 (1982).
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However, whether or not the potential damages are real or will re-
main imagined depends upon several factors.
Many amici counsel and other interested parties held out a
slim hope for certiorari review by the U.S. Supreme Court. Plaintiff
did petition the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. How-
ever, the U.S. Supreme Court recently denied certiorari. In the au-
thor's view, the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari was a foregone
conclusion. Plaintiff faced an uphill battle, as the circuit courts
were aligned in support of the position expressed by the court in
B. V Engineering, and because a similar case involving Radford
University was also recently denied certiorari.35 The two cases
which provided the greatest support for the plaintiff's position in
B. V Engineering, Mills Music and Johnson faced a precarious exist-
ence.36 The Johnson case was decided before Atascadero and it is
likely that had the Atascadero decision been available, the outcome
would have been reversed. Mills Music was overruled by the court
in B. V Engineering. Thus, there was not a pressing need for review
of B. V Engineering by the Supreme Court.
A second factor is legislative action. As the court in B. V Engi-
neering recognized, Congress is a potential solution to the loophole
in federal copyright law. Legislative action which expressly sub-
jects state governments to liability under the federal Copyright Act
would indeed solve any legal protection dilemma created by the
court's decision. The court's analysis was premised in part upon
the belief that existing provisions of the Act do not contain suf-
ficient language indicating the express intent of Congress to abro-
gate state immunity with regard to copyright infringement. This
conclusion was reached despite the several express provisions in the
Act in which Congress saw fit to grant to the states certain excep-
tions for use which would otherwise constitute copyright infringe-
ment. The Act's language can be amended expressly to include
state governments.
For example, Chapter Five of the Act defines an infringer of a
copyright as "anyone" that violates any of the exclusive rights of
the copyright owner. Obviously, the Act's definition of an infringer
can easily be expanded to include express references to state govern-
ments and state liability for copyright infringement. Similarly, in-
dependent express references to state liability could appear in
sections setting forth the various limited exceptions to liability for
35. Richard Anderson Photography v. Radford Univ., 633 F. Supp. 1154 (W.D. Va.
1986).
36. Johnson v. Univ. of Va., 606 F. Supp. 321 (W.D. Va. 1985).
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otherwise infringing actions.3 7
While legislative action, could indeed be the cure-all, as sug-
gested by- the B. V Engineering court, the ability of Congress to
fashion a speedy remedy is always suspect. Dependence upon im-
mediate Congressional action to remedy the decision's implications
is not likely to produce sighs of relief from the private sector. Given
the inherent delays of the legislative process, it could take more
than a year or two for Congress to push an amendment through
both houses and close the state government copyright loophole.
Certainly, efforts can be made to to galvanize Congress into action.
Commercial interests may be able to focus Congressional attention
on the situation. The affected industries, such as the television and
motion picture industries, have an active lobbying presence in
Washington. It is also possible that significant legal and political
commentary can assist in accelerating Congress' review of the
situation.
A third factor which will impact the ramifications of the deci-
sion is the future conduct of the various state governments them-
selves. As mentioned above, many state attorney generals,
including California's, have in the past expressly declared that state
action was subject to the federal copyright laws.38 Despite the clos-
ing dicta of the B. V Engineering decision, in which the court refers
to the states' ability "to violate the federal copyright laws with vir-
tual impunity," state governments in general have long recognized
and respected the rights of intellectual property owners. There is
no evidence to suggest that the havoc foretold by Plaintiff and
amici, such as unrestricted reproduction of text materials and
software, will result .merely because of the B. V Engineering deci-
sion. Whether or not state governments will in the future use the
case as a license to steal remains to be seen.
In light of the court's holding, and until Congress addresses
the situation, vendors to state governments must look for alterna-
tive courses of action and remedies providing legal protection from
potential infringement. Vendors of intellectual property will not
simply stop doing business with state governments. Therefore, pro-
tective measures not dependent upon copyright should be empha-
sized. Such measures would appear to fall into three general
categories: injunctive relief from the courts, commercial practices
and technological protections.
Copyright infringement lawsuits seeking monetary damages
37. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 601(b)(3), 602(a)(1) (1982).
38. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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under federal copyright law against state governments are fore-
closed by B. V Engineering. However, case law has established that
the 1 lth Amendment does not bar federal suits against states to
obtain injunctions to prevent future violations of federal law.39
Thus, the possibility exists that injunctive relief is still available
under federal copyright law. The effectiveness of federal injunctive
relief as a sole remedy is questionable, as infringement is difficult to
detect and the relief does not address past conduct. However, fed-
eral injunctive relief may be the only remedy available to plaintiffs
who do not have a non-copyright cause of action.
For causes of action not grounded in copyright, plaintiffs may
still resort to federal and state courts seeking monetary damages.
However, from a procedural standpoint, if a claim for copyright
infringement does not exist, on what basis does a vendor seek dam-
ages? Breach of contract is a possibility if indeed a written contract
prohibiting copying or reproduction is in place. But in those situa-
tions where the state merely purchases goods pursuant to an invoice
or purchase order, what grounds exist to support the damage claim?
For many plaintiffs, non-copyright causes of action may not exist,
and federal injunctive relief is the only possible remedy. These
questions were not addressed in B. V Engineering as the case only
involved a copyright infringement damage claim. Contractual
claims and injunctive relief were not pursued by Plaintiff.
Contractual remedies remain a commercial alternative to copy-
right protection. For example, purchase, rental and license agree-
ments should be utilized by vendors to set forth strong remedies for
unauthorized reproduction and use of intellectual property. Li-
cense agreements governing reproduction and use of software pro-
grams are common in the computer industry, and vendors of other
copyrighted property can benefit by following the lead of the com-
puter industry. Vendors that in the past have simply sold products
to state governments pursuant to simple purchase orders or invoices
may benefit from utilizing more complex agreements containing
contractual provisions restricting the use of the vendors' products.
Contractual limitations on copying and reproduction similar to the
protections granted under the Copyright Act could be utilized by
vendors in written agreements with state governments.
State governments will still have a negotiating advantage, as
the competition for state government business is usually intense.
Especially in competitive bidding or supply situations, vendors may
39. Pennhurst, 465 U.S. 89, 104 S. Ct. 900; Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S. Ct. 441
(1908).
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be unable to insist upon the use of such protective contract provi-
sions. Nonetheless, the vendor selling directly to state governments
will in many instances have an opportunity to implement some pro-
tective contractual measures. It may be that manufacturers will
have to refuse some business opportunities because of the risk of
unrestrained product use and reproduction.
Vendors will also need to police their product distribution
channels to ensure that the contractual protections are implemented
in all sales to state governments. Products sold to state govern-
ments through distribution channels such as distributors or manu-
facturer representatives present a difficult control challenge for the
original vendor or manufacturer. Distributors and sales representa-
tives obviously have much less incentive to hamper purchase negoti-
ations by insisting on long term contractual protections benefitting
the manufacturer.
Another area of relief from the potential consequences ofB. V
Engineering involves the implementation of technological strategies
preventing the unrestrained use or reproduction of intellectual
property. Many computer software publishers have utilized anti-
copying technology in their products, ranging from so-called hard-
ware locks or keys to copy protection programming tricks written
into the program code. While not generally favored by either the
industry or the consumer, such technology offers a measure of ad-
ded protection when dealing with state governments under B. V
Engineering.
Unfortunately, not all inventions, works and products are sub-
ject to protection through technological means. It is difficult to im-
agine practical technological means to prevent the unauthorized use
or reproduction of books, movies or artwork. Thus, technology of-
fers limited protection for many vendors dealing with state
governments.
VI. CONCLUSION
The court addressed two key inquiries in its opinion in B. V
Engineering. The first inquiry was whether the state had waived its
immunity to suit for copyright infringement, and the second inquiry
was whether Congress abrogated the immunity from suit provided
the states under the eleventh Amendment. The authors feel that the
court's decision reasonably held that the state of California had not
expressly waived its immunity. However, there are significant
grounds on which to differ with the court's conclusion that Con-
[Vol. 5
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gress had not abrogated the state's eleventh Amendment immunity
when it enacted the federal Copyright Act.
The express provisions of the Act exempting certain state con-
duct from liability for copyright infringement appear to be a clear
expression of Congressional intent that states are subject to the
Copyright Act. Furthermore, the application of the Atascadero
strict scrutiny standard seems inappropriate when the federal courts
have exclusive jurisdiction over copyright infringement claims. A
lower level of scrutiny may well have resulted in a contrary ruling.
A large and potentially devastating loophole in federal copy-
right law has been opened by B. V Engineering, and it is likely that
it will take the proverbial act of Congress to remedy the situation.

